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IMPURITIES: 
AN AESTHETIC REFLECTION
TÂNIA MOREIRa*
Resumo: A história das ideias estéticas explorou, desde os seus primórdios, uma incompatibilidade entre esté-
tica e perfeição. Isso explica, por um lado, a tensão que encontramos em Platão e Aristóteles entre a teoria 
prescrita e a prática; mas também, por outro lado, a reivindicação moderna da imperfeição como um atributo 
da obra de arte em autores como Victor Hugo e Baudelaire. De facto, essa reivindicação só foi possível na esteira 
da terceira Crítica kantiana, que relançou os fundamentos da estética ao mesmo tempo que afastou a ideia 
de perfeição como finalidade. Este ensaio propõe que a estética da imperfeição assenta não numa apologia do 
acaso e do erro, mas antes que a falha nasce no exercício da liberdade máxima aliada a uma máxima exigên-
cia. Quer na criação, quer na recepção, a experiência estética implica mover-se num curso arriscado, sem garan-
tias ou segurança.
Palavras-chave: Estética da imperfeição; Falha; Risco. 
Abstract: The history of aesthetic ideas has explored, from its beginnings, an incompatibility between aesthet-
ics and perfection. On the one hand, this explains the tension found in Plato and Aristotle between the pre-
scribed theory and the practice. On the other hand, it also explains the modern claim of imperfection — as an 
attribute of the work of art — in authors such as Victor Hugo and Baudelaire. In fact, this claim was only pos-
sible in the wake of the third Kantian Critique, which restored the foundations of aesthetics while removing the 
idea of perfection as end. This essay proposes that an aesthetics of imperfection rests not on an apology of 
chance and error, but that flaw rises in the exercise of maximum freedom linked to a maximal demand. Whether 
in creation or reception, aesthetic experience implies moving on a risky course, without guarantees or safety.
Keywords: Aesthetics of imperfection; Flaw; Risk. 
Imperfection is, paradoxically, a guarantee of survival. 
Tzvetan Todorov
In ancient Greece, organized thought about beauty, similarly to organized thought about 
scientific as well as moral knowledge, was underpinned by a cosmological worldview, as a 
logically structured and hierarchized organic system where each part had its own rigorously 
and naturally determined function (ergon). Harmonious and serene, good and beautiful, and 
above all closed, delimited and as one, the kosmos was, then, at one time divine (theos) and 
logical (logos). And in the face of this objectivity, it is knowledge that assumes the role of 
un-veiling truth (aletheia); to un-cover it so as to see God (theoria). In this way, to read the 
remarks of Plato and Aristotle on art is also to avail oneself of those lenses through which 
the world is observed as something of a perfection in itself.
In Plato’s Parmenides, the contempt betrayed by Socrates for things like hair, mud and 
garbage (which, according with his persona in the dialogue, we see as they are and, as such, 
have no corresponding Forms, for they do not partake in the One1) clearly signals that resist-
ance to chaos that lies at the heart of the Greek soul. The unacceptable — be it the illogical 
in the scientific domain, the unjust in the moral or the ugly in the aesthetic one — is always 
* CITCEM. Researcher funded by Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia: SFRH/BD/108940/2015. up200204735@letras.up.pt. 
1 See PLATO, 1997: 364, 380 and passim. 
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a problem of the multiple, generator of diversity and inherently intriguing. The cleansing 
operation carried out by Plato in the vast impure fields of literature is thus not surprising. 
I am thinking, of course, of books II and III of The Republic, where pari passu an action of 
erasure and purging of several passages of the best poets — and the best among the best: Homer 
— is proposed, envisaging an adjustment of literature to the divine order of the cosmos2.
In fact, the problem here is substantially a moral one — and, as such, the subject is mostly 
Justice — because the need to eliminate the faults pointed out in those poetic works results, 
most prominently, from an imbalance, that is, from an unjustness (a lack of justice) relative 
to the expected moral perfection, in accordance with the above-mentioned cosmological 
base. This condition of truth to which literature should be subordinate — the behaviour of 
the gods and heroes in consonance with the irreproachable character one expects from divine 
and heroic creatures; filial respect owed to one’s progenitors; the advantage of punishing 
those who commit transgressions; fear of the gods — drives Plato to denounce works of 
poetry. In connection to this moral background, Plato focuses not merely on faults of con-
ception or content, but also on poetry’s faults at the level of construction (poiesis) and the 
perceptive experience of them (aesthesis). In that regard, there are pressing calls of atten-
tion to names, interjections or other verbal motives susceptible of eliciting chills in the audi-
ence (spectators, hearers or readers), moving their passions towards the cult of fear and 
feebleness of mind, straightforwardly condemnable in the view of the ideal city’s designers.
Literature, as Plato envisages it, absolutely idealized, does not therefore accommo-
date appalling realism, a defective or poor counsellor. Keen on submitting everything to the 
political order as a consummation of the metaphysics of Forms, Plato nevertheless leaves 
open, here and there, an incompatibility between the perfection of poetry (that is, its con-
formity to exclusively poetic ends) and the perfection of the ideal city, such divergence 
resting on the principle of specialization that governs each function performed by the cit-
izens. In fact, Plato acknowledges that the words picked out by Homer and other major 
poets are indeed the most poetic, but it is precisely here one runs into an obstacle: it so hap-
pens that «the more poetic they are, the less they should be heard by children or by men 
who are supposed to be free and to fear slavery more than death»3. In another passage, 
further ahead, Adeimantus is forced to conclude that narration is the pure mode that should 
be followed by the poet, but soon enough Socrates introduces the caveat that, after all, «the 
mixed style is pleasant. Indeed, it is by far the most pleasing to children, their tutors, and 
the vast majority of people», ending up concluding: «But perhaps you don’t think that it 
harmonizes with our constitution, because no one in our city is two or more people simul-
taneously, since each does only one job»4. The outcome of this reply comes right in the fol-
lowing section, with the verdict of banishing poets from the city, with the exception of those 
who adhere to a strict obedience to the precepts in force5.
2 See PLATO, 1997: 1015-1035. 
3 PLATO, 1997: 1024.
4 PLATO, 1997: 1035.
5 «But, for our own good, we ourselves should employ a more austere and less pleasure-giving poet and storyteller, one who 
would imitate the speech of a decent person and who would tell his stories in accordance with the patterns we laid down 
when we first undertook the education of our soldiers» (PLATO, 1997: 1035).
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However, this defence of a pure poetry that coincides with an anaesthetic literature 
has no proven examples to offer. The poet of poets himself, Homer, for centuries considered 
the educator of Greece and highly esteemed by Plato, is widely quoted as Plato’s blue pencil 
runs callously through the passages that must be eliminated or reformulated, concerning 
the selection of modes, rhythms and instruments worthy of being listened to, and the cri-
teria of selection follow the same track, with a view to the effectiveness of platonic educa-
tional ideology.
Let us now look into the qualitative, yet subtle, leap that takes place in art theory, as 
we move from the Academy to the Lyceum. We saw how Plato directed his attention towards 
the sort of object imitated and the form of imitation employed. The same inconsistency 
observed a while back in The Republic, between theory and practice, shall be found again 
in Aristotle, though with more salient contrasts, given that the tension between the norma-
tive theoretical discourse and the descriptivist presentation produces, in the context of the 
Aristotelian Poetics in a more puzzling conflict (and the mere fact that we have a Poetics by 
Aristotle but none by Plato is significant by itself).
According, to Roselyne Dupont-Roc’s and Jean Lallot’s introduction to their transla-
tion of the Poetics, Aristotle was aware of that conflict between theory and practice, between 
prescribed norm and confirmed example, having done what he could in order to attenuate 
it6. Thence, a pronouncement becomes inescapable: «the most cherished tragedies and authors 
are not those that better comply with the ideal norm»7. We return, in fact, to the same dif-
ficulty detected in Plato: the theoretical model advocated by Aristotle exists nowhere in prac-
tice, since not even the exemplary Homer can satisfy the requirements8. Two illustrative cases 
of that conflict concern, one, the relevant or secondary role attributed to spectacle (opsis)9, 
and the other, perhaps more impressive, the golden rule of Aristotelian Poetics — namely, 
the law of necessity and verisimilitude in action (mythos) — law which is overcome by the 
aesthetic effect of wonder (thaumaston).
Now, all of the above is framed in this manner because Aristotle conceives the poetic 
work as a microcosm, teleologically regulated by its own internal, specific laws. And this 
is the qualitative difference relative to the Platonic theory of art. Although it fulfils its role 
of analogon of the cosmos as such, the artistic object presupposes a teleological function-
ing in conformity. So, despite placing the emphasis on the final product, Aristotle consid-
ers that, to achieve it, the rules of art (techne) must be applied10. Indeed, Aristotle is quite 
aware that the trade of the poet as such is a work of language and, consequently, poetic mime-
6 Cf. DUPONT-ROC & LALLOT, 1980: 13 and passim.
7 DUPONT-ROC & LALLOT, 1980: 12; my translation.
8 Praises such as the following are, however, frequent: «All of which Homer was the first to employ and employed proficiently. 
[…] In addition, each [of his poems] excels all epics in diction and thought» (ARISTOTLE, 1995: 119), or this one: «Homer 
deserves praise for many other qualities, but especially for realising, alone among epic poets, the place of the poet’s own 
voice» (ARISTOTLE, 1995: 121 and 123).
9 To assess the variation in importance of the role attributed to spectacle, compare 1450b 15-20 with 1462a 15-1462b (see 
ARISTOTLE, 1995: 53, 55, 139 and 141).
10 This explains, by the way, the option taken by the translators, Dupont-Roc and Lallot, in going against the tradition by 
rendering mimeisthai, and further lexemes of the sort, not as immitate, but as represent, shifting the focus from a putative 
object-model to the produced object. 
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sis is defined as representation of human actions through language. Here is what justifies the 
philosopher’s condescendence toward error (hamartia) incidentally made by the poet in 
that which does not concern his craft — as when he errs in representing a horse when he is 
not an expert in equestrianism — a flaw incomparably less objectionable than a mistake 
inherent to the poetic art itself, for in a society where each one has his very well defined 
role within the hierarchic system, to fail in one’s specialty, that is, in the function one serves, 
is unacceptable11.
We have then two distinct types of error — say, the error in representation (inciden-
tal, external to the object, and thus excusable) and the error of representation (poetic, inter-
nal to the object and thus condemnable). Aristotle distinguishes, within the error inherent 
in poetics, a series of reprehensible procedures, calling attention to the means of avoiding 
them12. In my view it is more pressing to point out strategic benevolence with which the 
author of the Poetics allows certain slips, as long as — and in this formula lies the reason — 
those slips are mixed in the right quantity and quality with the virtues of the artist. In other 
words, and making use of the repertory of taste, Aristotle concedes that certain mistakes 
can be like the right seasoning in the best food. Observe this passage, where once again it 
is evident the tension between normative and descriptive poetics is evident: in referring 
to the irrationality of certain plots, Aristotle holds that «one should not construct plots like 
this. […] Even the irrational details in the Odyssey about the putting ashore would patently 
be intolerable if an inferior poet were to handle them; as it is, Homer uses his other qual-
ities to soften and disguise the absurdity»13. Such concessions are often closely connected 
to the wonder (thaumaston) that Aristotle considers of primary importance in arousing 
catharsis in the spectator’s mind, a purpose without which tragedy is not fulfilled as such. 
This effect of surprise is crucial in the history of aesthetic theory, because it works at the 
core of the receptor’s sensibility and aesthesic capacity. Reflections by many distinct fig-
ures of Modernity14, have dwelled on that effect through different modulations, spanning 
from disturbance to shock, from novelty to freshness, from the uncommon to the bizarre, 
from the disconcerting to the reflective… We can say, then, that this is a cornerstone of 
modern aesthetics.
Proceeding our journey through the foundations of aesthetics in the 18th century, I 
would still like to highlight two references that seem to me decisive: to Horace’s Epistola ad 
Pisones and to the treatise Peri Hupsous by the Pseudo-Longinus, the latter probably dating 
from the 1st century A.D., and thus one century after Horace. In the letter addressed by Horace 
to the Piso family, the Roman poet lays out a program that puts strong emphasis on the prin-
ciple of poetarum limae labor, encouraging the disapproval of «a poem which many a day 
11 See ARISTOTLE, 1995: 127 and 129.
12 That is the subject of the penultimate chapter: see ARISTOTLE, 1995: 125-137.
13 ARISTOTLE, 1995: 125.
14 Namely, among others, as Joseph Addison in his essays for The Spectator (1712-1717), or Diderot, in his several articles on 
aesthetics (in the second half of the 18th century), or Edmund Burke in his Philosophical Enquiry (1757), or Friedrich Schiller 
in his Letters and essays (at the end of the 18th century), or William Wordsworth in his Preface to Lyrical Ballads (1800), morn-
ing on, finally — so as not to be exhaustive — to the Breton of the surrealist manifestos (1924 and 1930) or to Leonard Koren’s 
WET magazine (1976-1981).
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and many a blot has not restrained and refined ten times over to the test of the close-cut 
nail»15. While no doubt, on the one hand, Horace tirelessly underlines the need of time and 
distance relative to the work, without relinquishing permanent reassessment and the crit-
ical eye16; on the other hand, he manifests a certain indulgence towards errors, when these 
are made, one should note, by the poets that master the art17. When spelled out, the Hor-
atian argument is the following: when the poet, who inspired by ingenium, cultivates art 
to the highest standards (educating himself intensely in the reading and emulation of the 
best authors), fails in his work, he fails because he is human, and such an attribute is not 
alien to, but rather inherent to his condition.
Horace’s intransigence in this domain is directed, rather, to mediocre poets who not 
only commit often the same mistakes but also exhibit their mediocrity through a narcis-
sistic approval of error an intolerance to criticism that demands a return to the text and its 
reformulation. It so happens, then, that this emphasis on polishing work, on the matura-
tion of the text and on the poet who wrote it, on the humility that should characterize 
him, and on the incessant possibility of revising the work (in waves of detachment and 
approximation between subject and object), conjoins, in the end, two ideas that comple-
ment each other.
1. That, since the work is susceptible to revisitation and constant revision, there is no 
place for advocating a perfect work of art. The very demand of keeping time, which is cru-
cial in Horatian poetics, clashes with the idea of perfection: perfectus, according to its Latin 
etymology (combination of the prefix per- with the verb -facio, meaning that which is utterly 
completed, having run its course18). Now, nothing is more at odds with Horace’s conception 
of poetic labour than this idea of closure, completeness, of satisfaction without distress. For 
to experience distress involves a possibility, the openness — and the adventure — of a rebel-
lious event that eludes closure. On the contrary, to live in distress (because unsatisfied with 
one’s work), seems to be a condition that positively emanates from Epistola ad Pisones.
2. (derived from 1.): Every full stop in the work is an artifice, a posture one accepts in 
the (more or less firm) conviction of the precariousness which is akin to the very condition 
of the work of art.
Such a lack of guarantee for a poet concerning the value of his work acquires a special 
influence, in my view, when, at a certain point, Horace (who, since he is classical, advocates 
the principles of unity and verisimilitude, description and simplicity, subtlety and prudence) 
puts the following challenge to poets: «Not enough is it for poems to have beauty: they must 
have charm, and lead the hearer’s soul where they will. […] If you would have me weep, you 
15 HORACE, 1942: 475.
16 Observe carefully vv. 291-294, partially quoted in the body of the text: «poetarum limae labor et mora […] carmen rep-
rehendite quod non / multa dies et multa litura coercuit atque praesectum deciens non castigavit ad unguem» (HORACE, 
1942: 474; my italics).
17 See HORACE, 1942: 479ff. Furthermore, Horace grants that works with flaws are successful in their ability to capture the 
audience’s interest: see HORACE, 1942: 477.
18 The prefix per- conveys the meaning of «complete accomplishment of action, closure, perfection» apparent in verbs such 
as perdoceo («to fully teach, instruct»), perficio («to fully make, to finish, complete, conclude, execute») and perfruor («to enjoy 
fully, wholly»). 
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must first feel grief yourself»19. This aesthetic congeniality will appear later on, further devel-
oped, in the treatise by Pseudo-Longinus, also in the form of an epistle.
Pseudo-Longinus knows that correctness tends to prove fatally ineffective when the 
purpose is to strike the reader. And so, he praises a writer like Plato, who «is often carried 
away by a sort of Bacchic possession in his writing into harsh and intemperate metaphor and 
allegorical bombast»20 and reproaches Caecilius for preferring Lysias over Plato, given that 
the former is «immaculate and never makes a mistake, whereas Plato is full of mistakes»21. 
The position assumed by the Greek theorist in this domain is put forward in the following 
terms:
Suppose we illustrate this by taking some altogether immaculate and unimpeachable writer, 
must we not in this very connection raise the general question: Which is the better in poetry and 
in prose, grandeur flawed in some respects, or moderate achievement accompanied by perfect 
soundness and impeccability? And again: is the first place in literature rightly due to the largest 
number of excellences or to the excellences that are greatest in themselves? […] I am well aware 
that the greatest natures are least immaculate. Perfect precision runs the risk of triviality, whereas 
in great writing as in great wealth there must needs be something overlooked. Perhaps it is inev-
itable that humble, mediocre natures, because they never run any risks and never aid at the heights, 
should remain to a large extent safe from error, while in great natures their very greatness spells 
danger22.
Although Pseudo-Longinus forthwith states that blemishes still upset him, he puts 
forward the same justification that was implicit in Horace but taking it a step further: the 
flaws we find in great authors, like Homer and others of his stature, Pseudo-Longinus chooses 
«to call them not wilful mistakes but careless oversights, let in almost casually and at random 
by the heedlessness of genius»23.
The problem we face, thus, is not that of error having only one accidental (and as such 
specious and unpredictable) condition, which is registered as a flaw in the work, but a quite 
different problem. The imperfection, a certain kind of imperfection, is engraved on the work 
at the opportune moment (kairos) of creation by the creator endowed with genius. We must 
thereby understand the Longinian genius in light of his aesthetic theory based on the arche-
typical category of the sublime. For Pseudo-Longinus, the sublime poetic work, which is 
the poetic work of the genius, acquires a sort of immunity through the cross-fertilization 
of natural elements («the power of grand conceptions» and «the inspiration of vehement 
emotion») and technical skills («the proper construction of figures», «nobility of language» 
and «dignified and elevated word-arrangement»24). Now, greatness of verbal expression 
and ethical greatness mutually pervade one another, so that if the greatness of the elevated 
spirit is due to the freedom with which it despises petty issues, like money and other attend-
19 HORACE, 1942: 459.
20 LONGINUS, 1995: 265.
21 LONGINUS, 1995: 267.
22 LONGINUS, 1995: 267 and 269. 
23 LONGINUS, 1995: 269; my italics. 
24 See LONGINUS, 1995: 181.
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ing evils (the desire of fame, lust or arrogance…25), likewise, at the appropriate moment of 
creation, the poet uses that freedom in laying the groundwork of his verbal work. It is from 
that freedom that the power to err emerges. And I make the caveat that we are not speaking 
of just any freedom, a kind of post-modern anything goes, in which chance is left to chance, 
as is encouraged in contemporary glitch art. Nothing more remote than a certain eulogy of 
blunder, claiming «the glory of imperfection»26, tending to fall into an original extravagance 
that, as was keenly observed by Kant27, should be avoided through the counterbalance of 
originality by the exemplariness of the created object; this is the case if we wish to deal in 
works of genius, works which are worthy of memory and thus unyielding to the passage of 
time — a chief arbiter in the treatise of the Pseudo-Longinus. We speak, rather, of a condi-
tion that only the rare few can assume because it is, as a bulwark, a renouncement to the 
immediate and the accessible; that is, of a spirit relentlessly compelling the models, pro-
foundly knowledgeable of the potentialities of their raw-material; of an experienced and 
mature sensibility; of a capacity for enthusiasm and its aesthesic contagion as well as ethi-
cal exemplariness. This, one must agree, is neither negligible, nor for just anyone. It requires 
a great amount of effort and dedication, besides natural talent, and on that point all the clas-
sical authors I mentioned are in agreement, despite variations in what elements they empha-
size within the same question.
In the tradition of Christian thought, the idea of perfection on which the Graeco-Latin 
culture rested will remain, although with significant variants that introduce, in the concept, 
the dynamism and the excess from the perspective of a negative theology28. Perfection still 
relates to an object external to man, and towards which he must direct his gaze. The object 
he produces will always be a reflection, or a mirror, to use the expression consecrated by 
Abrams in his classic The Mirror and the Lamp. This order of ideas will persist until moder-
nity, when an effective «revolution against the rule of perfection and finality»29, occurs a 
revolution in which the aesthetic sphere had played a preeminent role.
Nevertheless, in the middle of the 18th century, precisely in 1750, the establishment of 
aesthetics as a philosophical discipline by Baumgarten, a follower of the dogmatic ration-
alism of Leibniz and Wolf, rests on an operation in which the legitimization of aesthesis as 
a source of knowledge is diminished with the consideration that the gnoseological foun-
dation of sense experience is of an inferior kind, and this leads to reasonings such as the fol-
lowing: «The object of aesthetics is the perfection of sense knowledge as such, that is, beauty. 
It must avoid the imperfection of sense knowledge as such, that is, ugliness»30. And this is 
because, for Baumgarten, beauty consists in the «phenomenal evidence of an object’s per-
fection»31. In fact, we are squarely opposed to the position manifested by Victor Hugo less 
than a century later, when, in his Preface to Cromwell, he calls attention to
25 Cf. LONGINUS, 1995: 299ff.
26 KESSELS, 2016: 5-6. 
27 See KANT, 2000: 186ff. 
28 On this subject, see FOSS, 1946: 25ff.
29 FOSS, 1946: 76.
30 BAUMGARTEN, 1988: 121; my translation.
31 PRANCHÈRE, 1988: 11; my translation.
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the thread that frequently connects what we, following our special whim, call «defects» to what 
we call «beauty.» Defects — at least those which we call it — are often the native, necessary, una-
voidable condition of qualities. […] Such a blemish can be the inevitable consequence of such 
beauty. This rough stroke of the brush, which offends my eye at close range, completes the effect 
and gives relief to the whole. Efface one and you will efface the other. Originality is made of such 
things. Genius is necessarily uneven. […] and then, once more, there are defects which take root 
only in masterpieces; it is given only to certain geniuses to have certain defects32. 
In fact, the primacy of romantic originality here alluded to would not have been pos-
sible without the decisive contribution of Kant and, in particular, the Copernican revolu-
tion he carried out and from which onwards the idea that sensibility is an inferior kind of 
knowledge stopped making sense. As key moment in the history of aesthetics, the Kantian 
philosophy will significantly propitiate the consecration of modern man as a source of 
knowledge, accepting his sensory limitation and at the same time assuming himself as full-
fledged creator.
In what concerns the imperfection of the work of art, Kant not only corrects the ration-
alist dogmatism of Leibniz and Wolff origin, which considered the sensory world as infe-
rior to the intelligible one (as it was in Platonism and Christian theology), but also the other 
side of the argument, that of the sensualists, all of whom ended up converging in this par-
ticular point. In fact, an empiricist like David Hume is quite assertive in his attack on artis-
tic blemishes. At a given point of his article Of the Standard of Taste (1757), before enunci-
ating the criteria of taste, Hume declares:
Many of the beauties of poetry, and even of eloquence, are founded on falsehood and fic-
tion, on hyperboles, metaphors, and an abuse or perversion of terms from their natural meaning. 
To check the sallies of the imagination, and to reduce every expression to geometrical truth and 
exactness, would be the most contrary to the laws of criticism; because it would produce a work, 
which, by universal experience, has been found the most insipid and disagreeable. But though 
poetry can never submit to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to the author 
either by genius or observation. If some negligent or irregular writers have pleased, they have not 
pleased by their transgressions of rule or order, but in spite of these transgressions: they have pos-
sessed other beauties, which were conformable to just criticism; and the force of these beauties has 
been able to overpower censure and give the mind a satisfaction superior to the disgust arising 
from the blemishes33. 
In his turn, just like the Pseudo-Longinus, but now with a philosophical support that 
was not feasible until then, Kant defines genius ascribing it the quality of the flaw34. It is 
because «genius is the exemplary originality of the natural endowment of a subject for the 
free use of his cognitive faculties» that he
32 HUGO, 1963: 452; my translation. 
33 HUME, 1965: 7-8.
34 It is never too much to reinforce this pivotal idea of Kantian aesthetics, which gives the title of section 15, the «Analytic 
of the Beautiful»: «The judgment of taste is entirely independent from the concept of perfection» (KANT, 2000: 111). This 
because the judgement of taste is not determined by any concept.
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is an example, not for imitation (for then that which is genius in it and constitutes the spirit of 
the work would be lost), but for emulation by another genius, who is thereby awakened to the 
feeling of his own originality, to exercise freedom from coercion in his art in such a way that the 
latter thereby itself acquires a new rule, by which the talent shows itself as exemplary35. 
It is in this context that, like Victor Hugo, the German philosopher condemns those 
who copy, that is, the false creators who instead of genuinely creating merely imitate, ech-
oing here a distinction between first and second-rate creators, which we already observed in 
the end of the 16th century, in the work De gl’Heroici Furori36, published by Giordano Bruno 
in 1585, where the Nolan philosopher distinguishes those poets who imitate from those who 
invent: the former stick to following precepts, while the latter are the true creative geni-
uses. Kant points out the distinction between the true models and the epigones. The imitat-
ing occurs when
the student copies everything, even down to that which the genius had to leave in, as a deformity, 
only because it could not easily have been removed without weakening the idea. This courage is 
a merit only in a genius, and a certain boldness in expression and in general some deviation from 
the common rule is well suited to him, but is by no means worthy of imitation, but always remains 
in itself a defect which one must seek to remove, but for which the genius is as it were privileged, 
since what is inimitable in the impetus of his spirit would suffer from anxious caution37. 
This retraction spurred by fear of failure is thus unbefitting of the genius, who enjoys 
a privileged freedom in the play of the faculties when he commits to the act of creation. It 
is not that the genius cannot tremble, but that fear cannot imprison him, or else he is not 
anointed, a rare species of nature, as Kant defines it. Note that error, according to Kant, despite 
its undesirability, in since it is the result of a risky operation carried out in the work of genius, 
consists in a side effect whose expurgation may compromise the aesthetic idea38. The Kan-
tian argument makes use here of belligerent notions — such as risk, danger, insecurity and 
courage — already presented by the Pseudo-Longinus when the subject is the imperfection 
inherent in the works of geniuses39. Either accidental or parallel, the flaw bursts from genial 
impetus. It is often the result not of negligence refined by intuition, but of a sudden lack of 
control spurred by the thirst of overcoming, like the violin string that breaks in the middle 
of a Paganini Capriccio, or the wrong note on the trumpet in a torrential improvisation. The 
mistake may be, then, the diadem of artistic excellence. In this sense, nothing comes so close 
to and, paradoxically, is so far removed from the aesthetics of imperfection as the musical 
genre of the étude. Accompanying the technical evolution of the instrument, and taking 
advantage of it, the étude feeds, at least, on the urge to improve and it seeks, at most, to achieve 
virtuosity. Incapacity is thus resisted to the point of immodesty; the stain of embarrassment 
35 KANT, 2000: 195-196.
36 See BRUNO, 1965: 82-84. There too he anticipates Kant in another principle, when he states that «poetry is not born of the 
rules», on the contrary, «the rules derive from the poetry» (BRUNO, 1965: 83).
37 KANT, 2000: 196.
38 See KANT, 2000: 196.
39 See LONGINUS, 1995: 267, 269 and 271.
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revolves so as to gape in pride. As a «form of the inflation of the many»40, the excessive is its 
mark, and for there to be excess there has to be risk. The feat occurs not against, but with 
the risk of failure, in tandem with it. On the other hand, the profound (and unspeakable) 
desire of the étude lies in a lofty contempt for technique in overcoming all difficulties it may 
present to the performer. Imperfection is thus not a reckless disregard, because it is unpre-
pared, but a negligence that involves enhancing the most qualified technical domain, an 
unforeseen creative potential, distilled from maximum control.
To venture. To run the risk. To be in danger. The resistance thus activated pervades the 
work soliciting from the subject who approaches it the same proof of resistance: a proof in 
two occurences and two objects (in the text that resists it and in the interpreter who resists 
it). An imperfect perfection that takes risks and cannot but lead one into taking risks. After 
all, the courage that the Pseudo-Longinus ascribed to the writer of genius, the writer of the 
sublime, is not merely the prerogative of the artist. The proof, the feat, befits also the sub-
ject of the reception in the exact sense in which, as Victor Hugo wrote, «for colossal books 
there must be athletic readers»41. In setting his poetico-aesthetic proposal on an epistemo-
logical ground (romantic art paints life as it is), the Preface to Cromwell puts the emphasis 
on mixture as a result of a dialectical phenomenology. Against classical unity — uniform, 
monotonous and predictable —, modernity, as a time of synthesis, fosters the multiform, the 
always living. 
The impurities evoke the contamination effect, of a residue identified as alien to the 
body in which it settles and, at the same time, adheres to. In a work of art, the object is per-
vious to such residues. Imperfection’s perfection resides in that character which is inextri-
cable from the flaw. It is not a dark point that, by contrast, stresses the intensely bright spots, 
but is in itself a powerful, blinding radiance of light, that displaces and imbalances. The 
flaw lends itself as the Barthesian punctum, that detail towards which the eye drifts with-
out ceasing to be, however, the singularity it is and perceived as such42. «What is not slightly 
deformed has an air of insensitivity — hence it follows that irregularity, that is, the unex-
pected, the surprise and the amazement are an essential part and the characteristic of beau-
ty»43, the poet who has lit the fuse to the tradition of rupture tells us44. An excessive light that 
brings forth resistance, the anguish of an active waiting, just like that we undergo when, 
faced with a perfect cadence at the end of a piece, we wish to believe that the music is not 
yet over at that point: because it cannot end that way, because it requires resolution, even 
when it is delayed, it does not come at all it, is postponed or discarded. The point that inter-
rupts, suspends, a disautomatization claiming our attention and with it the suspension of 
unitary time. Viktor Shklovsky has termed as estrangement (ostranenie) the poetico-aesthetic 
principle attached to art’s purpose of leading «us to a knowledge of a thing through the organ 
of sight instead of recognition» given that 
40 MOYSAN, 2014: 177. 
41 apud SAINT GIRONS, 2005: 7; my translation. 
42 See BARTHES, 1981: 40-43.
43 BAUDELAIRE, 1968: 625; my translation.
44 On the «tradition against itself», see the excellent book Children of the Mire (PAZ, 1991: 1-18). 
211
IMPURITIES: 
AN AESTHETIC REFLECTION
By ‘estranging’ objects and complicating form, the device of art makes perception long and 
‘laborious’. The perceptual process in art has a purpose all its own and ought to be extended to 
the fullest. Art is a means of experiencing the process of creativity. The artefact itself is quite 
unimportant45. 
In this phenomenology of aesthetic reception, I point out particularly the obscuring 
of form and the foundation of time, the durée in a Bergsonian sense. What has already 
become has ceased to interest; form is to be obscured. The poetic work, in that sense, consists 
in a double labour of creating the formula — the figure — so as to subsequently erase its 
track. The reader will be thrown into that unknown, strange place, where he will linger, feed-
ing an unremitting anguish before the circumstance of his experience. Precisely in De l’Im-
perfection, that magical book written in the end of his life, Greimas calls our attention to 
the place where such wonderment that strikes the subject and transforms him irrupts, the 
fracture that pitches against «the stony dream» of classical beauty, petrified and unproduc-
tive, an «aesthetics of grace», full of a moving aura of vulnerability and care46. In being per-
ceived as an element of dispersion, the flaw moves an expectation: in place of the safety of 
the one, the uncertainty of a wait that does not keep itself is offered. It is an exercise of wait-
ing. One needs to expect the unexpected, and more than that: to nurture that wait. Everything 
takes place in that pained moment, expressed by Lyotard through the question Is it happen-
ing?47. The work always in process; the wait wrought by that peaking anguish and attention. 
In that suspended and immeasurable instant, suspended beyond measure, a boundless inten-
sity transports the subject-object of the experience into an anastatic sphere. Of the singu-
larity of what may happen, something eludes understanding and the subject is thrown into 
an agitation, that activity of the mind that Kant connects with the experience of the sublime. 
The fecundity of the flaw lies in revealing the sensible phenomenon. Hence, we may ask: is 
the paradox not instead the aesthetics of perfection?48 When Greimas writes that «Imperfec-
tion appears as a springboard projecting us from insignificance towards meaning»49, that mean-
ing is everything but the meaning. To be projected towards meaning is to risk the adventure 
of a drift, that of the precariousness of the attempt at meaning. No promised land, no guar-
anteed result. Art hardly lends itself as a palliative: and perhaps that is in fact its greatest 
consolation. Imperfection, like a failing heart, can be the criterion of happiness for a work 
of art. And that is something we should not deny it.
45 SHKLOVSKY, 1991: 6. 
46 Cf. GREIMAS, 1987: 13ff., 17, 33; my translation.
47 LYOTARD, 1991: 92 and passim. 
48 On imperfection as an aesthetic value and the seeming paradox of the aesthetics of imperfection, see HAMILTON, 2000: 
171 and passim.
49 GREIMAS, 1987: 99; my translation. 
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